Original Research Article | OPEN ACCESS

How do Boards Moderate the Powers of Powerful CEOs?

For correspondence:-    

Received: 27 July 2018        Accepted: 30 August 2018        Published: 30 September 2018

Citation: How do Boards Moderate the Powers of Powerful CEOs?. Account Tax Rev 2003; 2(3):76-88 doi:

© 2003 The authors.
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Abstract

This study is motivated by a need to understand conceptually how boards moderate the powers of powerful CEOs. To achieve this objective, a library research design was employed to review relevant concepts, theories and literature on CEO-board relations. Sources of CEO power and the avenues through which they get and use power were x-rayed. It is concluded from the study that board power being a pre-requite requirement for a vigilant and effective board, needs to be incorporated in future studies on dominant CEOs and organisational outcomes. This will lead to a synthesis of complementary theories associated with such relationship in future empirical studies.

Keywords: Boar powers, agency theory, corporate collapse, organizational structure, managerial expertise